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Abstract
In this paper, we propose novel generative models for
creating adversarial examples, slightly perturbed images
resembling natural images but maliciously crafted to fool
pre-trained models. We present trainable deep neural net-
works for transforming images to adversarial perturba-
tions. Our proposed models can produce image-agnostic
and image-dependent perturbations for targeted and non-
targeted attacks. We also demonstrate that similar archi-
tectures can achieve impressive results in fooling both clas-
sification and semantic segmentation models, obviating the
need for hand-crafting attack methods for each task. Us-
ing extensive experiments on challenging high-resolution
datasets such as ImageNet and Cityscapes, we show that
our perturbations achieve high fooling rates with small per-
turbation norms. Moreover, our attacks are considerably
faster than current iterative methods at inference time1.
1. Introduction
In spite of their impressive performance on challenging
tasks in computer vision such as image classification [25,
49, 51, 52, 20] and semantic segmentation [30, 5, 9, 59, 60],
deep neural networks are shown to be highly vulnerable to
adversarial examples, i.e. carefully crafted samples look-
ing similar to natural images but designed to mislead a pre-
trained model. This phenomenon was first studied in [53],
and may hinder the applications of deep networks on visual
tasks, or pose security concerns.
Two types of adversarial perturbations can be consid-
ered: Universal and Image-dependent. Image-dependent
perturbations can vary for different images in the dataset. To
generate these perturbations, we require a function which
takes a natural image, and outputs an adversarial image.
We approximate this function with a deep neural network.
Universal perturbations are fixed perturbations which when
added to natural images can significantly degrade the accu-
racy of the pre-trianed network. In this case, we seek a per-
1Code is available at https://github.com/OmidPoursaeed/
Generative_Adversarial_Perturbations.
turbation U with small magnitude such that for most natural
images x, x+ U can fool the pre-trained model. Unlike the
iterative approaches proposed in the literature, we consider
trainable networks for learning the universal perturbation.
From another viewpoint, adversarial attacks can be cat-
egorized as targeted and non-targeted. In targeted adver-
sarial attacks, we seek adversarial images that can change
the prediction of a model to a specific target label. In non-
targeted attacks we want to generate adversarial examples
for which the model’s prediction is any label other than
the ground-truth label. Considering all the possible com-
binations, we can have four types of adversarial examples:
targeted universal, non-targeted universal, targeted image-
dependent and non-targeted image-dependent. We elabo-
rate on each of them in the following sections.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We present a unifying framework for creating univer-
sal and image-dependent perturbations for both clas-
sification and semantic segmentation tasks, consider-
ing targeted and non-targeted attacks with L∞ and L2
norms as the metric.
• We improve the state-of-the-art performance in univer-
sal perturbations by leveraging generative models in
lieu of current iterative methods.
• We are the first to present effective targeted universal
perturbations. This is the most challenging task as we
are constrained to have a single perturbation pattern
and the prediction should match a specific target.
• Our attacks are considerably faster than iterative and
optimization-based methods at inference time. We can
generate perturbations in the order of milliseconds.
2. Related Work
2.1. Universal Perturbations
First introduced in [35], universal perturbations are fixed
perturbations which after being added to natural images can
mislead a pre-trained model for most of the images. The
algorithm in [35] iterates over samples in a target set, and
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gradually builds the universal perturbation by aggregating
image-dependent perturbations and normalizing the result.
[38] presents a data independent approach for generating
image-agnostic perturbations. Its objective is to maximize
the product of mean activations at multiple layers of the net-
work when the input is the universal perturbation. While
this method obviates the need for training data, the results
are not as strong as [35]. A method for generating targeted
universal adversarial perturbations for semantic segmenta-
tion models is presented in [34]. Their approach is similar
to [35] in that they also create the universal perturbation
by adding image-dependent perturbations and clipping the
result to limit the norm. [36] proposes a quantitative analy-
sis of the robustness of classifiers to universal perturbations
based on the geometric properties of decision boundaries. A
defense method against universal adversarial perturbations
is proposed in [1]. It learns a Perturbation Rectifying Net-
work (PRN) from real and synthetic universal perturbations,
without needing to modify the target model.
2.2. Image-dependent Perturbations
Various approaches have been proposed for creating
image-dependent perturbations. Optimization-based meth-
ods such as [53] and [8] define a cost function based on the
perturbation norm and the model’s loss. Then they use gra-
dient ascent in pixel space with optimizers such as L-BFGS
or Adam [24] to create the perturbation. While these ap-
proaches yield better results than other methods, they are
slow at inference time as they need to forward the input to
the model several times.
[18] proposes a Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) to
generate adversarial examples. It computes the gradient of
the loss function with respect to pixels, and moves a single
step based on the sign of the gradient. While this method
is fast, using only a single direction based on the linear ap-
proximation of the loss function often leads to sub-optimal
results. Based on this work, [37] presents an iterative al-
gorithm to compute the adversarial perturbation by assum-
ing that the loss function can be linearized around the cur-
rent data point at each iteration. [26] introduces the Itera-
tive Least-Likely Class method, an iterative gradient-based
method choosing the least-likely prediction as the desired
class. This method is applied to ImageNet in [27]. It also
discusses how to effectively include adversarial examples
in training to increase model’s robustness. [11] proposes a
method for directly optimizing performance measures, even
when they are combinatorial and non-decomposable. [39]
generates images unrecognizable to humans but classified
with high confidence as members of a recognizable class.
It uses evolutionary algorithms and gradient ascent to fool
deep neural networks. Our work bears a resemblance to [6]
in that it also considers training a network for generating ad-
versarial examples. However, [6] does not provide a fixed
bound on the perturbation magnitude, which might make
perturbations detectable at inference time. It is also limited
to targeted image-dependent perturbations. [58] extends ad-
versarial examples from the task of image classification to
semantic segmentation and object detection. For each im-
age, it applies gradient ascent in an iterative procedure until
the number of correctly predicted targets becomes zero or a
maximum iteration is reached. Similar to [53] and [8], this
method suffers from being slow at inference time. [2] evalu-
ates the robustness of segmentation models against common
attacks. [31] suggests that adversarial examples are sensi-
tive to the angle and distance at which the perturbed picture
is viewed. [4] presents a method for generating adversarial
examples that are robust across various transformations.
Several methods have been proposed for defending
against adversarial attacks. While our focus is on efficient
attacks, we refer the reader to [33, 57, 19, 47, 32, 50, 48, 54,
3, 13, 44, 16, 55, 45, 42, 56] for recent works on defense.
3. Generative Adversarial Perturbations
Consider a classification network K trained on natu-
ral images from C different classes. It assigns a label
K(x) ∈ {1, . . . , C} to each input image x2. We assume
that images are normalized to [0, 1] range. Let N ⊂ [0, 1]n
represent the space of natural images3. We assume that K
achieves a high accuracy on natural images. Therefore, if
we denote the correct class for image x by cx, K(x) = cx
for most x ∈ N. Let AK stand for the space of adversarial
examples for the network K. Images in AK must resemble
a natural image yet be able to fool the network K. Hence,
for each a ∈ AK there exists x ∈ N such that d(a, x) is
small and K(a) 6= cx, where d(·, ·) is a distance metric.
This framework can be easily extended to the task
of semantic segmentation in which the correct class for
each pixel needs to be determined. In this case, the
segmentation network K assigns a label map K(x) =
(K(x1), . . . , K(xn)) ∈ {1, . . . , C}n to each image
x = (x1, . . . , xn). The ground-truth prediction for image x
is cx = (cx1 , . . . , cxn), and the set of adversarial examples
is AK = {a ∈ [0, 1]n\N | ∃ x ∈ N : d(a, x) <  , ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , n} : K(ai) 6= cxi}, where  is a fixed threshold4.
3.1. Universal Perturbations
Universal Perturbations were first proposed in the sem-
inal work of Dezfooli et al. [35]. The paper proposes an
iterative algorithm to generate the universal perturbation.
It constructs the universal perturbation by adding image-
dependent perturbations obtained from [37] and scaling the
result. Unlike the iterative approach of [35], we seek an
2Note that x may or may not belong to the space of natural images.
3For images of height h, width w and c channels: n = h× w × c.
4We can also relax the constraint, and require that for most pixels the
prediction is different from the ground-truth.
Figure 1: Training architecture for generating universal adversarial perturbations. A fixed pattern, sampled from a uniform
distribution, is passed through the generator. The scaled result is the universal perturbation which, when added to natural
images, can mislead the pre-trained model. We consider both U-Net (illustrated here) and ResNet Generator architectures.
end-to-end trainable model for generating the universal per-
turbation. Let us denote the set of universal perturbations
for the network K by UK = {U ∈ [0, 1]n | for most x ∈
N : x + U ∈ AK}. We do not want the perturbation to di-
rectly depend on any input image from the dataset. We seek
a function f : [0, 1]n → UK which can transform a random
pattern to the universal perturbation. By changing the input
pattern, we can obtain a diverse set of universal perturba-
tions. In practice, we approximate f(·) with a deep neural
network fΘ(·) with weights Θ. This setting resembles Gen-
erative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17, 43, 15, 28, 21]
in which a random vector is sampled from a latent space,
and is transformed to a natural-looking image by a genera-
tor. In our case the range of the mapping is UK instead of
N, and the generator is trained with a fooling loss instead of
the discriminative loss used in GANs. We also tried using a
combination of fooling and discriminative losses; however,
it led to sub-optimal results.
There are several options for the architecture of the im-
age transformation network fΘ(·). We consider two ar-
chitectures used in recent image-to-image translation net-
works such as [22] and [61]. The U-Net architecture [46]
is an encoder-decoder network with skip connections be-
tween the encoder and the decoder. The other architecture is
ResNet Generator which was introduced in [23], and is also
used in [61] for transforming images from one domain to
another. It consists of several downsampling layers, residual
blocks and upsampling layers. In most of our experiments,
the ResNet Generator outperforms U-Net.
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture for generating uni-
versal perturbations. A fixed pattern Z ∈ [0, 1]n, sampled
from a uniform distribution U [0, 1]n, is fed to a generator
fΘ to create the perturbation. The output of the generator
fΘ(Z) is then scaled to have a fixed norm. More specifi-
cally, we multiply it by min
(
1, ‖fΘ(Z)‖p
)
in which  is the
maximum permissible Lp norm. Similar to related works
in the literature, we consider p = 2 and p = ∞ in exper-
iments. The resulting universal perturbation U is added to
natural images to create the perturbed ones. Before feeding
the perturbed image to the generator, we clip it to keep it in
the valid range of images on which the network is trained.
We feed the clipped image xˆ to the network K to obtain
the output probabilities k(xˆ)5. Let 1cx denote the one-hot
encoding of the ground-truth for image x. In semantic seg-
mentation, cx ∈ {1, . . . , C}n is the ground-truth label map,
and k(xˆ) contains the class probabilities for each pixel in xˆ.
For non-targeted attacks we want the prediction k(xˆ) to be
different from 1cx , so we define the loss to be a decreasing
function of the cross-entropy H(k(xˆ),1cx). We found that
the following fooling loss gives good results in experiments:
lnon−targeted = lfool = − log(H(k(xˆ),1cx)) (1)
Alternatively, as proposed by [26] and [27], we can consider
the least likely class kll(x) = arg min k(x), and set it as the
target for training the model:
lnon−targeted = lfool = log(H(k(xˆ),1kll(x))) (2)
In practice, the losses in equations 1 and 2 lead to competi-
tive results. We also found that for the Inception model, the
logit-based loss used in [7, 8] yields optimal results.
For targeted perturbations we consider the cross-entropy
with the one-hot encoding of the target:
ltargeted = lfool = log(H(k(xˆ),1t)) (3)
where t represents the target. Note that for the classification
task, t ∈ {1, . . . , C} is the target class while in semantic
segmentation, t ∈ {1, . . . , C}n is the target label map.
3.2. Image-dependent Perturbations
We consider the task of perturbing images as a transfor-
mation from the domain of natural images to the domain
of adversarial images. In other words, we require a map-
ping f : N → AK which generates a perturbed image
5Note that K(xˆ) = argmax k(xˆ).
Figure 2: Architecture for generating image-dependent perturbations. The generator outputs a perturbation, which is scaled
to satisfy a norm constraint. It is then added to the original image, and clipped to produce the perturbed image. We use the
ResNet Generator architecture for most of the image-dependent tasks.
Figure 3: Architecture for training a model to fool multiple target networks. The fooling loss for training the generator is a
linear combination of fooling losses of target models.
f(x) ∈ AK for each natural image x ∈ N. A desirable
function f(·) must result in a low accuracy and a high fool-
ing ratio. Accuracy denotes the proportion of samples x
for which K(f(x)) = cx, while fooling ratio represents the
ratio of images x for which K(f(x)) 6= K(x). Since we
assume that the model achieves a high accuracy on natural
images, these two metrics are highly correlated.
We consider two slightly different approaches for ap-
proximating f(·). The first approach is to parametrize it di-
rectly using a neural network fΘ(·). Hence, we seek Θ such
that for most x ∈ N: K(fΘ(x)) 6= K(x). We also require
that the perturbed image fΘ(x) look similar to the original
image x. Hence, d(x, fΘ(x)) needs to be small for most
x ∈ N, where d(·, ·) is a proper distance function. The sec-
ond approach is to approximate the difference of natural and
adversarial images with a neural network fΘ(·). We require
that for most x ∈ N : K(x+ fΘ(x)) 6= K(x) ≈ cx, and the
Lp norm of the additive perturbation ‖fΘ(x)‖p needs to be
small in order for it to be quasi-imperceptible. The second
approach gives us better control over the perturbation mag-
nitude. Hence, we will focus on this approach hereafter.
Figure 2 shows the architecture for generating image-
dependent perturbations. Input image x is passed through
the generator to create the perturbation fΘ(x). The pertur-
bation is then scaled to constrain its norm. The result is
the image-dependent perturbation which is added to the in-
put image. We feed the clipped image xˆ to the network to
obtain the output probabilities k(xˆ). We use loss functions
similar to the universal case as defined in equations 1–3.
At inference time, we can discard the pre-trained model,
and use only the generator to produce adversarial examples.
This obviates the need for iterative gradient computations,
and allows us to generate perturbations fast.
3.3. Fooling Multiple Networks
Using generative models for creating adversarial pertur-
bations enables us to train sophisticated models. For in-
stance, we can consider training a single model for mislead-
ing multiple networks simultaneously. Suppose we have
models K1, K2, . . . , Km trained on natural images. Let
AK denote the space of adversarial examples for these tar-
get models, i.e. AK = {a ∈ [0, 1]n\N | ∃ x ∈ N :
d(x, a) <  , ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , m} : Ki(a) 6= Ki(x) ≈ cx},
in which d(·, ·) is a distance function,  is a pre-specified
threshold and cx is the ground-truth for x. We can con-
sider both universal and image-dependent perturbations. In
the case of universal perturbations, we seek a mapping
F : [0, 1]n → AK generating adversarial examples from in-
put patterns. In practice, the function is approximated with
a deep neural network FΘ. Figure 3 depicts the correspond-
ing architecture. It is similar to figure 1 other than that the
resulting perturbed image xˆ is fed to each of the pre-trained
models. The loss function for training the generator is a lin-
ear combination of fooling losses of pre-trained models as
(a) Perturbation norm: L2 = 2000, target model: VGG-16
(b) Perturbation norm: L∞ = 10, target model: VGG-19
Figure 4: Non-targeted universal perturbations. Enhanced
universal pattern is shown on the left, and two samples of
perturbed images are given on the right.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet152
L2 = 2000
GAP
UAP
93.9%
90.3%
94.9%
84.5%
79.5%
88.5%
Table 1: Fooling rates of non-targeted universal perturba-
tions for various classifiers pre-trained on ImageNet. Our
method (GAP) is compared with Universal Adversarial Per-
turbations (UAP) [35] using L2 norm as the metric.
defined in equations 1–3. Hence, we have:
lmulti−fool = λ1 · lfool1 + · · ·+ λm · lfoolm (4)
in which {λ1, . . . , λm} ⊂ IR is a set of weights cho-
sen based on the difficulty of deceiving each target model.
The architecture for image-dependent perturbations is sim-
ilar except that inputs to the generator are natural images.
4. Experiments on Classification
We generate adversarial examples for fooling classifiers
pre-trained on the ImageNet dataset [14]. For the Euclidean
distance as the metric, we scale the output of the generator
to have a fixed L2 norm. We can also scale the generator’s
output to constrain its maximum value when dealing with
the L∞ norm. All results are reported on the 50,000 images
of the ImageNet [14] validation set. Note that the contrast of
displayed perturbations is enhanced for better visualization.
7Since [35] does not report results on Inception-v3, we compare with
their results on Inception-v1 (GoogLeNet).
7This result uses the logit-based loss [7, 8] as opposed to the least-likely
class loss (equation 2), which is used for other results in the table.
VGG16 VGG19 Inception6
L∞ = 10
GAP
UAP
83.7%
78.8%
80.1%
77.8%
82.7%7
78.9%
Table 2: Fooling rates of non-targeted universal perturba-
tions using L∞ norm as the metric.
4.1. Universal Perturbations
Non-targeted Universal Perturbations. This setting cor-
responds to the architecture in figure 1 with the loss func-
tions defined in equations 1 and 2. Results are given in Ta-
bles 1 and 2 for L2 and L∞ norms respectively. For most
cases our approach outperforms that of [35]. Similar to [35],
a value of 2000 is set as the L2-norm threshold of the uni-
versal perturbation, and a value of 10 is set for theL∞-norm
when images are considered in [0, 255] range8. We use U-
Net and ResNet Generator for L2 and L∞ norms respec-
tively. We visualize the results in figure 4. Notice that the
L2 perturbation consists of a bird-like pattern in the top left.
Intuitively, the network has learned that in this constrained
problem it can successfully fool the classifier for the largest
number of images by converging to a bird perturbation. On
the other hand, when we optimize the model based on L∞
norm, it distributes the perturbation to make use of the max-
imum permissible magnitude at each pixel.
Targeted Universal Perturbations. In this case we seek
a single pattern which can be added to any image in the
dataset to mislead the model into predicting a specified tar-
get label. We perform experiments with fixed L∞ norm of
10, and use the ResNet generator for fooling the Inception-
v3 model. We use the loss function defined in equation 3
to train the generator. Figure 5 depicts the perturbations for
various targets. It also shows the top-1 target accuracy on
the validation set, i.e. the ratio of perturbed samples clas-
sified as the desired target. We observe the the universal
perturbation contains patterns resembling the target class.
While this task is more difficult than the non-targeted one,
our model achieves high target accuracies. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first to present effective targeted
universal perturbations on the ImageNet dataset. To make
sure that the model performs well for any target, we train
it on 10 randomly sampled classes. The resulting average
target accuracy for L∞ = 10 is 52.0%, demonstrating gen-
eralizability of the model across different targets.
4.2. Image-dependent Perturbations
[8] proposes a strong method for creating targeted
image-dependent perturbations. However, its iterative al-
8The average L2 and L∞ norm of images in our validation set are
consistent with those reported in [35].
(a) Target: Soccer Ball, Top-1 target accuracy: 74.1%
(b) Target: Knot, Top-1 target accuracy: 63.6%
(c) Target: Finch, Top-1 target accuracy: 61.8%
Figure 5: Targeted universal perturbations. Three differ-
ent targets and the corresponding average target accuracy of
perturbed images on Inception-v3 are given. Universal pat-
tern is shown on the left and two sample perturbed images
are depicted on the right. Perturbation norm is L∞ = 10.
gorithm is very slow at inference time. It reports attacks
that take several minutes to run for each image, making it
infeasible in real-time scenarios in which the input image
changes constantly. FGSM [18] is a fast attack method but
is not very accurate. In this work, we present adversarial
attacks that are both fast and accurate.
Non-targeted Image-dependent Perturbations. The cor-
responding architecture is given in figure 2 with the loss
function defined in equations 1 and 2. We use ResNet gen-
erator with 6 blocks for generating the perturbations. Sim-
ilar to related works on image-dependent perturbations, we
focus on L∞ norm as the metric. Results are shown for var-
ious perturbation norms and pre-trained classifiers in Table
3. Figure 6 illustrates the perturbed images. In this case the
model converges to simple patterns which can change the
prediction for most images. As we observe, the perturba-
tions contain features from the corresponding input images.
Targeted Image-dependent Perturbations. For this task
we use the training scheme shown in figure 2 with the loss
L∞ = 7 L∞ = 10 L∞ = 13
VGG16
66.9%
(30.0%)
80.8%
(17.7%)
88.5%
(10.6%)
VGG19
68.4%
(28.8%)
84.1%
(14.6%)
90.7%
(8.6%)
Inception-v3
85.3%
(13.7%)
98.3%
(1.7%)
99.5%
(0.5%)
Table 3: Fooling ratios (pre-trained models’ accuracies) for
non-targeted image-dependent perturbations.
function in equation 3. Figure 7 shows samples of perturbed
images for fooling the Inception-v3 model. The perturba-
tions are barely perceptible, yet they can obtain high target
accuracies. Moreover, the perturbation itself has features
resembling the target class and the input image. See figure
7 for more examples. We also evaluate performance of the
model on 10 randomly sampled classes. The average target
accuracy for L∞ = 10 is 89.1%, indicating generalizability
of the proposed model across different target classes. The
average inference time for generating a perturbation to fool
the Inception-v3 model is 0.28ms per image, showing that
our method is considerably faster than [8]9.
4.3. Transferability and Fooling Multiple Networks
Several works have demonstrated that adversarial exam-
ples generated for one model may also be misclassified
by other models. This property is referred to as transfer-
ability, and can be leveraged to perform black-box attacks
[53, 18, 40, 41, 29, 10, 7]. We show that our generated per-
turbations can be transferred across different models. Table
4 shows the fooling ratio of a non-targeted universal attack
trained on one network and evaluated on others. Each row
corresponds to the pre-trained model based on which the at-
tack model is learned. The last row of the table corresponds
to a model trained to jointly mislead VGG-16 and VGG-19
models based on the architecture depicted in figure 3. We
see that joint optimization results in better transferability
than training on a single target network. This is expected
as the network has seen more models during training, so it
generalizes better to unseen models.
5. Experiments on Semantic Segmentation
Current methods for fooling semantic segmentation
models such as [58] and [34] use iterative algorithms, which
are hand-engineered for the specific task, and are slow at in-
ference. We demonstrate that our proposed architectures are
generalizable across different tasks. More specifically, we
show that architectures similar to those used in the classi-
fication task yield strong results on fooling segmentation
9The time is measured on Titan Xp GPUs.
(a) L∞ = 7
(b) L∞ = 10
(c) L∞ = 13
Figure 6: Non-targeted image-dependent perturbations.
From left to right: original image, enhanced perturbation
and perturbed image. Three different thresholds are consid-
ered with Inception-v3 as the target model.
VGG16 VGG19 ResNet152
VGG16 93.9% 89.6% 52.2%
VGG19 88.0% 94.9% 49.0%
ResNet152 31.9% 30.6% 79.5%
VGG16 + VGG19 90.5% 90.1% 54.1%
Table 4: Transferability of non-targeted universal perturba-
tions. The network is trained to fool the pre-trained model
shown in each row, and is tested on the model shown in each
column. Perturbation magnitude is set to L2 = 2000. The
last row indicates joint training on VGG-16 and VGG-19.
models. We leave extension to tasks other than classifi-
cation and segmentation as future work. Experiments are
performed on the Cityscapes dataset [12]. It contains 2975
training and 500 validation images with a resolution of
2048 × 1024 pixels. Similar to [34], we downsample im-
ages and label maps to 1024×512 pixels using bilinear and
nearest-neighbor interpolation respectively.
(a) Target: Soccer Ball, Top-1 target accuracy: 91.3%
(b) Target: Hamster, Top-1 target accuracy: 87.4%
Figure 7: Targeted image-dependent perturbations. Two
different targets and the corresponding average target accu-
racy of perturbed images on Inception-v3 are shown. From
left to right: original image, enhanced perturbation and per-
turbed image. Perturbation magnitude is set to L∞ = 10.
5.1. Universal Perturbations
We first consider the more challenging case of targeted
attacks in which a desired target label map is given. We
use the same setting as in the classification task, i.e. the
training architecture in figure 1 with the fooling loss defined
in equation 3. In order for our results to be comparable with
[34], we consider FCN-8s [30] as our segmentation model,
and use L∞ norm as the metric. Our setting corresponds
to the static target segmentation in [34]. We use the same
target as the paper, and consider our performance metric to
be success rate, i.e. the categorical accuracy between the
prediction k(xˆ) and the target t. Table 5 demonstrates our
results. Our method outperforms the algorithm proposed in
[34] for most of the perturbation norms. We also visualize
(a) Perturbation (b) Perturbed image (c) Prediction for perturbed image (d) Target
Figure 8: Targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 10 for fooling the FCN-8s semantic segmentation model.
(a) Perturbation (b) Perturbed image (c) Prediction for perturbed image (d) Target
Figure 9: Targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 10 for fooling the FCN-8s model.
L∞ = 5 L∞ = 10 L∞ = 20
GAP (Ours) 79.5% 92.1% 97.2%
UAP-Seg [34] 80.3% 91.0% 96.3%
Table 5: Success rate of targeted universal perturbations for
fooling the FCN-8s segmentation model. Results are ob-
tained on the validation set of the Cityscapes dataset.
the results in figure 8. We observe that the generator fools
the segmentation model by creating a universal perturbation
which resembles the target label map. We also demonstrates
the resulting mean IoU for non-targeted attacks in Table 6.
Task L∞ = 5 L∞ = 10 L∞ = 20
Universal 12.8% 4.0% 2.1%
Image-dependent 6.9% 2.1% 0.4%
Table 6: Mean IoU of non-targeted perturbations for fooling
the FCN-8s segmentation model on the Cityscapes dataset.
5.2. Image-dependent Perturbations
The targeted image-dependent task corresponds to the
architecture in figure 2 with the loss function in equation
3. We use the same target as the universal case. Results
for various norms are given in Table 7. As we expect, re-
laxing the constraint of universality leads to higher success
rates. Figure 9 illustrates the perturbations for L∞ = 10.
By closely inspecting the perturbations, we can observe pat-
terns from both the target and the input image. As shown
L∞ = 5 L∞ = 10 L∞ = 20
GAP 87.0% 96.3% 98.2%
Table 7: Success rate of targeted image-dependent pertur-
bations for fooling FCN-8s on the Cityscapes dataset.
in Table 6, image-dependent perturbations achieve smaller
mean IoU by not having the universality constraint. The av-
erage inference time per image is 132.82 ms for the U-Net
architecture and 335.73ms for the ResNet generator10.
6. Discussion and Future Work
In this paper, we demonstrate the efficacy of genera-
tive models for creating adversarial examples. Four types
of adversarial attacks are considered: targeted universal,
non-targeted universal, targeted image-dependent and non-
targeted image-dependent. We achieve high fooling rates
on all tasks in the small perturbation norm regime. The
perturbations can successfully transfer across different tar-
get models. Moreover, we demonstrate that similar archi-
tectures can be effectively used for fooling both classifica-
tion and semantic segmentation models. This eliminates the
need for designing task-specific attack methods, and paves
the way for extending adversarial examples to other tasks.
Future avenues of research include incorporating various
properties such as transformation-invariance into the per-
turbations and extending the proposed framework to tasks
other than classification and semantic segmentation.
10The time is measured on Titan Xp GPUs.
(a) Target model: VGG-19, Fooling ratio: 94.9%
(b) Target model: VGG-16, Fooling ratio: 93.9%
Figure 10: Non-targeted universal perturbations. From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and perturbed
image. Perturbation norm is set to L2 = 2000 for (a) and (b) and to L∞ = 10 for (c) and (d).
(c) Target model: Inception-v3, Fooling ratio: 79.2%
(d) Target model: VGG-19, Fooling ratio: 80.1%
Figure 10: Non-targeted universal perturbations (continued). From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and
perturbed image. Perturbation norm is set to L2 = 2000 for (a) and (b) and to L∞ = 10 for (c) and (d).
(a) Target: Jigsaw Puzzle, Top-1 target accuracy: 89.3%
(b) Target: Teapot, Top-1 target accuracy: 62.2%
Figure 11: Targeted universal perturbations. From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and perturbed image.
Perturbation norm is set to L∞ = 10, and target model is Inception-v3.
(c) Target: Chain, Top-1 target accuracy: 64.9%
(d) Target: Hamster, Top-1 target accuracy: 60.0%
Figure 11: Targeted universal perturbations (continued). From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and
perturbed image. Perturbation norm is set to L∞ = 10, and target model is Inception-v3.
(a) L∞ = 7
(b) L∞ = 10
(c) L∞ = 13
Figure 12: Non-targeted image-dependent perturbations. From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and
perturbed image. Three different thresholds are considered with Inception-v3 as the target model.
(a) Target: Jigsaw puzzle, Top-1 target accuracy: 98.1%
(b) Target: Knot, Top-1 target accuracy: 95.0%
Figure 13: Targeted image-dependent perturbations. From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation and per-
turbed image. Perturbation norm is set to L∞ = 10, and Inception-v3 is the pre-trained model.
(c) Target: Chain, Top-1 target accuracy: 89.7%
(d) Target: Teapot, Top-1 target accuracy: 90.6%
Figure 13: Targeted image-dependent perturbations (continued). From top to bottom: original image, enhanced perturbation
and perturbed image. Perturbation norm is set to L∞ = 10, and Inception-v3 is the pre-trained model.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 14: Targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 5. Zoom in for details.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 15: Targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 10.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 16: Targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 20.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 17: Targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 5. Zoom in for details.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 18: Targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 10.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Target (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 19: Targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 20.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 20: Non-targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 5. Zoom in for details.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 21: Non-targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 10.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 22: Non-targeted universal perturbations with L∞ = 20.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 23: Non-targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 5. Zoom in for details.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 24: Non-targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 10.
(a) Original image (b) Perturbation (c) Perturbed image
(d) Prediction for original image (e) Groundtruth (f) Prediction for perturbed image
Figure 25: Non-targeted image-dependent perturbations with L∞ = 20.
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7. Appendix
7.1. Runtime Analysis
Note that inference time is not an issue for universal per-
turbations as we just need to add the perturbation to the in-
put image during inference. Therefore, we provide running
time only for image-dependent perturbations. In this case,
we need to forward the input image to the generator and get
the resulting perturbation. Table 8 demonstrates the infer-
ence time for image-dependent perturbations. It also shows
the generator’s architecture for each task including the num-
ber of filters in the first layer. We perform model-level par-
allelization across two GPUs, and batch size is set to be one.
Notice that inference time is in the order of milliseconds,
allowing us to generate perturbations in real-time. Table 9
shows inference time for the segmentation task. Two archi-
tectures with similar performance are given. Here we deal
with 1024 × 512 images in the Cityscapes dataset, and we
need models with more capacity; hence, the inference time
is larger compared with the classification task.
Task Architecture Titan Xp Tesla K40
Non-targeted
ResNet Gen.
6 blocks,
50 filters
0.27 ms 4.7 ms
Targeted
ResNet Gen.
6 blocks,
57 filters
0.28 ms 4.8 ms
Table 8: Average inference time per image and generator’s
architecture for image-dependent classification tasks. Tar-
get model is Inception-v3.
Architecture Titan Xp Tesla K40m
U-Net Generator:
8 layers, 200 filters 132.8 ms 511.7 ms
ResNet Generator:
9 blocks, 145 filters 335.7 ms 2396.9 ms
Table 9: Average inference time per image and generator’s
architecture for the semantic segmentation task. Targeted
image-dependent perturbations are considered with FCN-8s
as the pre-trained model.
7.2. Resistance to Gaussian Blur
We examine the effect of applying Gaussian filters to per-
turbed images. Results for the classification task are shown
in Table 10. In order to be comparable with [26], we con-
sider non-targeted image-dependent perturbations with De-
struction Rate (fraction of images that are no longer mis-
classified after blur) as the metric. For most σ values, our
method is more resistant to Gaussian blur than I-FGSM.
We also evaluate the effect of Gaussian filters for the seg-
mentation task. Results are given in Table 11. As we can
observe, the perturbations are reasonably robust to Gaussian
blur.
σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 σ = 1 σ = 1.25
GAP 0.0% 0.8% 3.2% 8.0%
I-FGSM 0.0% 0.5% 8.0% 23.0%
Table 10: Destruction Rate of non-targeted image-
dependent perturbations for the classification task. Pertur-
bation norm is set to L∞ = 16.
σ = 0.5 σ = 0.75 σ = 1 σ = 1.25
L∞ = 5 83.2% 76.9% 66.0% 57.1 %
L∞ = 10 94.8% 90.1% 80.0% 69.6%
L∞ = 20 97.5% 95.7% 89.3% 78.8%
Table 11: Success rate of targeted image-dependent pertur-
bations for the segmentation task after applying Gaussian
filters.
